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Introduction
The rapid emergence of China as an important player in the global economy is a remarkable issue with consequences for the rest of the world. An important aspect is foreign direct investment (FDI) since China has been attracting a growing share of FDI flows since 1990s.
After increasing demand for consumer goods, a relatively skilled and educated workforce for the wages paid, improved infrastructure and a more predictable business environment. Since the early 1980s, China has drawn significant investment from regional conglomerates in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and Singapore, but also from the largest industrial economies, particularly Japan and the US.
In the same way as many countries fear China as a competitor in the export markets, there is a growing concern, especially in developing countries, that FDI may be diverted into China. FDI is very important for Latin America since it has been the major source of external financing in the last few years and has also helped modernize the economic structure. A third aspect is the nature of Chinese inward FDI. If oriented towards exports, it might reduce FDI in other countries which compete in the same export markets. This will be less so if FDI is oriented towards China's domestic demand. In addition, if FDI substantially increases Chinese imports, it might foster FDI to other countries which are suppliers of Chinese imports. This will be particularly the case for exporters of commodities, which China is scarce of. This paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature of FDI determinants; section 3 describes the dataset, the variables included, their sources and the a-priori on their relation with Latin American inward FDI; section 4 sets out our econometric strategy and its advantages and caveats; section 5 reviews the results; and, finally, section 6 draws the main conclusions and policy implications. For a long time, the general view was that the "better" a country, in terms of its macroeconomic situation and institutional environment, the more easily it would attract FDI. For example, Albuquerque et al. (2002) find that macroeconomic stability increases FDI. Hines (1995) and Wei (1997) show that corruption discourages it, and the same is true for poor business operating conditions [Singh and Jun (1995) China. On the contrary, the FDI to Latin America is mainly originated in OECD countries, which accounted for 76% of the total received in 2002. Therefore, our work focuses on the FDI from OECD countries so as to guarantee a relatively high degree of integration of the FDI market and, thereby, real opportunities of substitution among destination countries.
We also construct another objective variable, as a robustness test, which reflects bilateral inward FDI to Hong Kong. This is because a lot of reinvesting takes place between the two economies and is not adequately accounted for in the statistics. This phenomenon, which is generally known as roundtripping, starts with China's exporting capital to Hong Kong, favoured by tax advantages. This capital, then, returns to China in the form of FDI.
The other potentially relevant determinants of FDI, which we include as control variables, are classified into: (i) capital flows, (ii) bilateral variables, (iii) host country factors, (iv) home country variables and (v) global factors.
The model estimated could be expressed as follows: To take this into account, we include FDI from the whole OECD to Latin America, as well as to China and Hong Kong. A positive and significant coefficient would indicate some kind of herd behaviour among foreign direct investors or "follow your competitor". Fourth, we also consider the possibility that FDI decisions may be taken at a regional level. In other words, if a country invests in, say, Chile, it could encourage additional investment in other Latin American countries. Fifth, we introduce FDI to OECD countries to test whether a possible preference of foreign direct investors to be present only in industrial countries discourages FDI to Latin America. Finally, we control for global trends in FDI flows. This is because it will certainly be easier for Latin American countries to receive investment boom years for FDI. All these variables are drawn from the above-mentioned OECD database.
As bilateral factors, we include the bilateral nominal exchange rate because it affects the cost of the investment -if paid in local currency -but also the value of repatriated profits.
A depreciation of the host country currency against the home country one reduces the cost of the investment but also profits repatriated, so that there is no clear a-priori on the expected sign of the coefficient. The data is drawn from the IFS and an increase implies a depreciation of the host currency against the home one. We add a measure of the relative investment cost, measured by the difference in the short-term interest rate between the host and the home country, and which is also drawn from the IFS. The coefficient of this variable should, in principle, be negative but only if the investment is financed locally; otherwise it would be the home interest rate or an international one to matter. In addition, we take bilateral exports and imports from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. This allows us to control for the potential sustituibility or complementarity between exports/imports and inward FDI, as described in the previous section. Finally, we include an index of the similarity in the production structure between the home and the host countries, based on two-digit manufactured value added data from United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 4 This variable should Finally, other potentially relevant host factors. Macroeconomic conditions related to the external sector, such as the level of external debt to GDP, the debt service, international reserves and export growth are included. Although no strong consensus exists in the empirical literature as to their influence, the first two should, in principle, bear a negative relation with inward FDI while the last two, particularly the latter, should be positively related.
Other host macroeconomic conditions are GDP growth, the level of domestic investment to GDP, and the fiscal balance, whose coefficients should, in principle, be positive. Inflation and the real exchange rate may be expected to reduce inward FDI in as far as they lower the host country's competitiveness. All these variables are drawn from the IFS and the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Finally, the size of the economy should, in principle, foster FDI. We proxy it by a combination of GDP per capita and GDP Finally, other potentially relevant host country factors are financial crises. We include one dummy variable for each type of crisis, sovereign, currency or banking, which take the value of one in each year in which a country finds itself in a crisis. This allows us to capture the cumulative impact of each of these events. 6 The information is drawn from Díaz-Cassou, García-Herrero and Molina (2004). While we should generally expect crises to discourage foreign investors, it is also true that banking crises tend to be followed by the opening up of the banking system to foreign competition, mainly through privatization. This could attract FDI.
As for home county effects, we include GDP growth and GDP per capita, from the WEO database. Finally, we take developments in oil prices as the main global factor affecting FDI. These are drawn from Datastream. Table A-3 shows bilateral correlation between all these regressors.
5. We also control for both variables separately and the results do not change. 6. To test the robustness of the results, we construct a different dummy, which only takes the value of one in the first year of the crisis.
Empirical methodology
Given the paper's objective, determining in the most accurate way whether China's inward FDI affects Latin America's one, we face one major challenge: endogeneity. Endogeneity could lead to a biased coefficient of our objective variable (Chinese inward FDI). Other potential problems are how to deal with the adjustment costs of FDI, unobserved heterogeneity and the choice of the control variables not to lose too many degrees of freedom while avoid a missing variable problem. To tackle potential endogeneity, but also the existence of adjustment costs and unobserved heterogeneity, we use the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM), following Arellano and Bover (1995).
The Arellano-Bover estimator -also called system GMM estimator -combines the regression expressed in first differences (lagged values of the variables in levels are used as instruments) with the original equation expressed in levels (this equation is instrumented with lagged differences of the variables) and allows to include some additional instruments.
We prefer this option to a fixed-effects estimator for several reasons. We also tackle any potential omitted variable problem in an additional way. We, first estimate a general equation including all control variables considered [column (1) of Tables 1   and 2] . We, then, test -through a Wald test -the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables that are not significant individually are equal to zero. If not rejected, we re-estimate the model only with the controls which were significant in the general regression. Otherwise, we test a less restrictive hypothesis but still trying to reduce the number of regressors to the maximum extent possible. This is a sequential -from general to specific 9 -strategy, which we follow until we reject that the remaining set of coefficients of the control variables is equal to zero [Column (2) of Tables 1 and 2] . In this way, we achieve more efficient coefficients of the remaining parameters, including that of the variable of interest, Chinese inward FDI. The last model, apart from incorporating these restrictions on the regressors included, tests whether the effect of Chinese inward FDI is different across Latin American countries [Column (3) of Tables 1 and 2 ].
7.
As a robustness test we also instrumented for the bilateral nominal exchange rate. The results do not change. 8. In any event, the small sample problem is less acute for the Arellano-Bover estimator than the Arellano-Bond one, since it has been shown to provide more accurate estimations in small samples (Bond, 2002) . Additionally, this estimator does not require time stationarity as long as T is small, which seems to be our case. 9. See Hendry (2000) for details on the general to specific strategy. We also look into the impact of China on the inward FDI of each of the Latin American countries considered. Argentina and Colombia are negatively affected at a 5%
and 10% significance level, respectively, but the parameters are very small (Table 1, column 3). In addition, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of each Latin
American country are the same and equal to zero. Given the weakness of these two results,
we can generally conclude that there is virtually no "Chinese effect" on Latin American inward FDI in this long time span.
To report on the significance of the control variables, we concentrate on the restricted model since the estimators are more efficient. 10 First, we find a strong and significant complementarity effect between FDI and other private capital flows since the coefficient for total capital flows over GDP is positive and highly significance. This result supports the hypothesis of an elastic supply of FDI. Second, there is a certain degree of "regional behaviour" of investors, since an increase in FDI to a certain Latin American country from a given home raises investment in other countries of the region. This is shown in the highly significant, albeit small, coefficient of bilateral FDI to Latin America. Third, the amount of bilateral exports also appears to foster FDI, which supports the hypothesis of a complementarity -and not substitution -between the two. One possible interpretation is that the FDI received by Latin American countries is export oriented, at least in certain countries, and, therefore, fosters exports. Fourth, as one would expect, the availability of natural resources in the host countries contributes to higher inward FDI. Finally, and interestingly, the occurrence of banking crises appears to foster FDI in all three specifications. This causal link is probably not so much the banking crisis itself but rather the privatization and opening-up to foreign competition which have followed these crises in virtually all Latin American countries in our sample. 11 Finally, it should be noted that the fixed effects estimated for each home-host pair are also picking up the information of the regressors which barely change over time. This could explain why they are not found significant.
In a second exercise, we restrict the panel to a more recent time span, from 1995 to 2001. There are a number of reasons to choose this shorter time span. First, there may have been a structural change in the evolution of FDI since the mid-1990s. Second, China accelerated its negotiations for WTO membership in this period, until it finally entered the club 10. The bilateral nominal exchange rate, the debt service and GDP growth in the host country are only significant in the first specification with all regressors. The non-significance in the restricted model may be due to the increased number of observations and degrees of freedom. 11. The fact that this result is only found for the dummy which considers all crisis years, and not only the burst of the crisis, supports this interpretation.
in 2001. An additional, more technical, reason is that the potential problem of non-stationarity (although considered in the Arellano-Bover methodology) is clearly reduced for this shorter time span.
In this period, there is a clearly negative and significant effect of Chinese inward FDI on that to Latin America ( we test the extreme hypothesis of complete substitution from Latin American inward FDI to that of China. As could be expected, from our results, the hypothesis is rejected. Third, we run the regressions taking logs for all variables for which this is possible. Fourth, we account for the potential endogeneity of the bilateral exchange rate by taking instruments. Fifth and last, we control for the potential endogeneity of the externality associated to total FDI to Latin America excluding the FDI of the host country in point.
12. In other words, we can not reject that coefficients of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela are the same and equal to 0. 13. The results of these tests are available by request. in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995) (a) Although control variables' coefficients differ numerically with column (2), qualitatively, the results are the same. in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995) (a) Although control variables' coefficients differ numerically with column (2), qualitatively, the results are the same.
Variables removed in columns (2) and (3) are jointly not significant at a 95% confidence interval.
(b) These variables result from multiplying FDI to China and a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the observations of each of the host countries. while most of it concentrates on telecommunications and financial services. 14 In any event,
this interpretation of the results should be taken with care since we do not have enough evidence that this is the main channel through which China affects Latin American FDI. In fact, since the focus of our paper was the behaviour of global investors, we have opted for bilateral rather than sectoral data so that not much can be said about the channels in which China may influence other host countries. Both bilateral and sectoral data would be ideal but they are not available.
When looking into the future, there are reasons to expect that China will continue to receive large amounts of FDI, and perhaps even increase them: the country is bound to embark in a large privatization process, which has already been announced for some sectors.
In addition, the wage differential with Latin American countries will probably be maintained for quite some time given China's large -for some close to infinite -elasticity of labour supply.
Finally, even if wages increase substantially, they will be along with purchasing power for a very large population. This will make China a particularly attractive country for FDI targeting domestic demand.
This scenario, where China continues to attract a large share of world FDI, may seem worrisome for Latin American countries, particularly those with a more similar productive structure to that of China. However, it only reflects one side of the coin. At the same time, it provides tremendous opportunities in the medium term. Due to geographical reasons, Latin American countries are not in such good position as Asian economies to reap some of these benefits, such as assembling and re-exporting of manufactured products.
However, they will clearly benefit from China's increasing demand for raw materials in a scenario where China continues to grow fast. This is not only true for Latin American exports but also for inward FDI in sectors related to raw materials. Interestingly, potential investors in the region are not only the global players included in our database, basically OECD countries, but also China itself, which will want to ensure its access to raw material. This is why the 14. This has been estimated using FDI flows from the three main investors to Brazil, namely the US, Spain and Japan. Unfortunately, we cannot compare Mexico and Colombia with the other Latin American countries included in our analysis since we could not find sectoral information.
further opening of these sectors to foreign investors is a pre-condition for Latin American countries to reap these benefits of China's increasing global presence. 
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